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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SUMlVIFr RANGJ~ AND LIVESTOCK )
COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HAY REES,

j

Case No.
8063

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, the plaintiff below, is in substantial
disagreement with certain facts set forth by appellant
in his statement of facts, and therefore believes it desirable to set forth the following statement of facts:
Respondent is a corporation organized October 5,
1900 pursuant to the provisions of Chapter I, Part IV
of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888 (H. 40). The
original object for which the company was incorporated,
as contained in the Articles of Incorporation as well as
the objects set forth in the Amendment (R. 40-49) of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

April 25, 1925, are quoted on page 2 of Appellant's Brief.
The Articles of Incorporation also provided that the
Board of Directors shall have power to n1ake all by-laws
for the manage1nent of the business and property of the
company, the regulation of its affairs and the transfer
of its stock, for prescribing the duty of its officers and
such other by-laws, rules and regulations as may be
necessary for fully carrying out the objects of this
corporation, not inconsistent with law or other corporate
rights or vested privileges (R. 42). Appellant in his
statement of facts states (p. 3) that "the purpose of the
corporation since 1900 has remained that of a general
business corporation for profit." Hespondent agrees that
there has been no change in the Articles of Incorporation
with respect to the object, business and pursuits of the
corporation since April 25, 1925, but it disagrees with
the conclusion set out in said statement that the Articles
created a general business corporation for profit, or that
the Respondent has ever opera ted as such.
Respondent's complaint alleged (R. 1), and Appellant in his answer adinitted (R. 7), that the Respondent
owns and for many years has owned a large tract of
range land in Summit County, Utah, which has been held
and is now held by the Respondent for the use and benefit
of the stockholders. Appellant's brief, on page 3, states
that the trial court found that as time passed the company assu1ned a mutual, non-profit character. The
Respondent disagrees with this state1nent of alleged fact.
'rhe trial court's findings of fact contain no suggestion
that the Respondent ever "assun1ed" a different character
2
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than it started with and such a finding would have been
contrary to the evidence. 'l1he trial court found, as
alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer,
that the Respondent had owned the land in Sumrnit
County for rnany years and that it had been, and now is,
held by the Respondent for the use and benefit of the
stockholders of the corporation as range land upon which
the said stockholders are authorized to place their livestock for grazing purposes (R. 18).
By-laws were adopted by the Board of Directors on
March 4, 1952 ( R. 18) and a copy thereof submitted to
the trial court upon a stipulation of the parties (R. 28,
30-39). Appellant's brief described the by-laws to be "a
spelling out and an attempted ratification of the then
current practices of the corporation in allowing its stockholders to use, rent free, the grazing lands of the company." (Br. 3). This conclusion is not a fact as found
by the court. No evidence or testimony was offered in
the trial court on the "practices" of the corporation in
this rega1·d, as the point was never raised in the court
below.
Appellant is a stockholder of the Respondent corporation, owning 9101j2 shares of stock of the authorized
6000 shares ( R. 28, 41). During the 1952 grazing season
he was the only stockholder grazing cattle upon the
company range (R. 28). In placing his cattle upon the
company range, Appellant did so without regard to the
said by-laws, whereupon the Respondent filed its complaint in the Third Judicial Court in and for Summit
County on June 2, 1952, wherein the Respondent set out

3
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generally the provisions of certain by-laws and reciting
that Appellant had wilfully and intentionally placed his
cattle on the range prior to the authorized date, did not
advise the Board of Directors of what stock he intended
to place thereon, that he refused to keep his cattle in
the areas designated by the Board for the grazing of
cattle, that he permitted his cattle to graze on the high
summer range and did irreparable damage to young,
tender grass thereon, and that he refused to discuss the
matter with the Board and stated he intended to use the
range in accordance with his own desires. The complaint asked that he be enjoined from placing and grazing
his cattle on the range in defiance of the by-laws (R. 1-4).
Appellant answered alleging, not that the "by-laws
of the company were unlawful and contrary to the
objects of the articles of incorporation" as set out in
Appellant's brief (Br. 4), but only that those provisions
of the by-laws which stated "that the Board of Directors
shall annually designate areas of the range to be used
for the feeding of cattle, horses, or sheep; that such
cattle, horses or sheep men shall be responsible for keeping their respective types of stock in the areas so designated by the Board of Directors" were "in this particular
instance, unfair, unequitable, unlawful, contrary to the
intents and objects of the Articles of Incorporation, discriminative and prejudicial" to Appellant's substantive
rights as a stock holder, and that said provisions were
"confiscatory of this defendant's rights to the beneficial
use of the range" as a stockholder (R. 7, 8). Appellant
also alleged in his answer as an affirmative defense that
4
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"the purported by-laws were unlawful, etc., and contrary to the objects and intents of the articles of incorporation in the particular that said by-laws fail to equitably and annually assess the expenses of reasonable and
beneficial use of the range as between the sheep men,"
and the Appellant, a cattle man (R. 9). Appellant also
filed a counterclaim setting out certain of the by-laws,
alleging that the Respondent company was "organized
for the purpose of providing range land for cattle," that
Appellant had been deprived of his equitable use of the
range by the adoption of the by-laws and praying for
certain remedies including one that the court declare
void the provisions of those by-laws "which tend to
deprive the Defendant of his fair, equitable and equal
rights as a minority stockholder" (R. 9-13). An answer
to the counterclaim was filed (R.14, 15).
A question was submitted to the court upon a stipulation which provided that the only issue to be tried by
the court on January 24, 1953, the date on which the
case was originally set for trial, was whether paragraph
5 of Article I and paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of
the by-laws, or any part of said paragraphs, were invalid,
and that all other issues were to be tried or otherwise
disposed of at a future date (R. 28, 29). The stipulation
did not provide, as suggested in Appellant's brief (Br.
5), that the legality of all of the by-laws was to be decided
by the court. The stipulation also included a copy of the
articles of incorporation and the amendments thereto
(R. 40-51) and a copy of the by-laws (R. 30-39).
The three paragraphs submitted to the trial court

5
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for a ruling as to their validity read as follows:
Paragraph 5, Article I (R. 30, 31)
"If any stockholder desires to sell his stock
in the Corporation, or any part thereof, and shall
receive a bona fide offer for the purchase of his
stock from any person or . persons who are not
stockholders in the Corporation, the said stock
may not be sold or transferred to such person or
persons without first offering to sell the same to
the Company or other stockholders at the price
offered. Such offer for the sale of the stock shall
be made to the Board of Directors by the stockholder desiring to sell, and it shall be the responsibility of the Board of Directors to determine
whether the Con1pany or any of the other stockholders wish to purchase the stock at the price
offered for it.
"The Board of Directors shall advise the
stockholder within thirty days from the date the
offer is made as to whether or not the Company
or any other stockholder will buy the stock from
him. F·ailure to so advise shall constitute a waiver
of this right to buy on the part of the Compan;'
and other stockholders.
"This restriction on the transfer of stock
shall be valid and binding on all stockholders who
agree thereto and surrender their certificates to
the Company for the purpos·e of having this
restriction stamped on the said certificates as
required by Section 18-3-15 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1943."
Paragraph 8, Article V (R. 36, 37)
"The Board of Directors shall annually designate areas of the range to be used for the feeding
of cattle or horses. rl,he &."tent or acreage of such
6
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area shall be determined on the basis of the nrunber of shares held by the stockholders desiring to
place cattle or horses thereon, and shall include
ade4uate water facilities."
Paragraph 11, Article V ( R. 37)
"'The cattle and horse men shall he responsible for keeping their cattle and horses within the
area designated each year by the Board of Directors for use for grazing cattle and horses."

.I

I

It was Appellant's contention that these three bylaws were unfair, inequitable, unlawful, contrary to the
interests and objects of the Articles of Incorporation,
discriminative. and prejudicial to his rights and interests
as a stockholder. Respondent denied the same (R. 29).
The trial court found that the said three paragraphs
were not unfair, inequitable, unlawful or contrary to
the interests and objects of the Articles of Incorporation,
and did not discriminate and are not prejudicial to the
Appellant's substantive rights and interests as a stockholder, and concluded that the same were valid and
binding on the stockholders of the cmnpany (R. 18, 19).
Judgn1ent was accordingly entered adjudging the three
above set out paragraphs to be valid and binding on the
stockholders ( R. 20, 21). The trial court did not, as
stated in Appellant's brief (Br. 6), adjudge that all of
the by-laws were valid, but limited its ruling to the three
paragraphs of said by-laws submitted to it for determination by the stipulation (R. 20, 21).
STATEMENT OF' POINTS
In reply to Appellant's brief, Respondent wishes to
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present additional points for the consideration of the
Court. These points, together with Point III raised by
Appellant, will be specifically set out and discussed as
indicated below. It is believed that Appellant's Points
I and II will be covered in the Argument on the points
hereinafter set forth.
POINT I.
APPELLANT CANNOT ATTACK FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON THIS APPEAL THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THE BYLAWS OF RESPONDENT CORPORATION AS THAT QUESTl'ON WAS NEVER RAISED IN OR DECIDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.

POINT II.
APPELLANT CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF
DEFENSE UPON WHICH THE ISSUE PRESENTED TO THE
TRIAL COURT WAS TRIED AND PRESENT A NEW
THEORY OF DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE
APPELLATE COURT.

POINT III.
PARAGRAPH 5, ARTICLE I OF THE BY-LAWS IS
ILLEGAL BY AUTHORIZING THE COMPANY TO PURCHASE ITS OWN STOCK IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
In the opening paragraph of Appellant's brief (Br.
1) it is stated that the basic question involved in this
appeal is whether the ordinary business or trading
corporation can be changed into a cooperative merely by
the adoption of by-laws to that effect. With this statement, Respondent does not agree. That no such question
is involved will, it is believed, clearly appear from the
following discussion of Respondent's Statement of
Points.
8
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POINT I.
APPELLANT CANNOT ATTACK FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON THIS APPEAL THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THE BYLAWS OF RESPONDENT CORPORATION AS THAT QUESTION WAS NEVER RAISED IN OR DECIDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.

Appellant's Points I and II are surprising, to say
the least. In his notice of appeal, Appellant gave notice
of his appeal from the judgment entered in this action
on May 29, 1953 (R. 23). By said judgment the trial
court merely ruled that paragraph 5 of Article I and
paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of the By-Laws adopted
by the respondent corporation were valid and binding
upon all of the stockholders of said corporation (R. 20).
The stipulation entered into between Appellant and
Respondent expressly limited the issue in the court below
to the validity of the said three paragraphs (R. 28, 29).
Appellant, in his Point I, now for the first time in this
action attacks the validity of all of the By-Laws and
asks this court to rule that all of said By-Laws are
invalid and illegal. Not only was that question never
presented to the court below, but Appellant has never
at any time suggested that all of the By-Laws were
invalid or illegal for any reason.
It is a well settled rule of law, established by numerous courts in nurnerous cases, subject to certain limitations not applicable here, that the appellate court will
consider only such questions as were raised and reserved
in the court below. (See cases set out in note 15, 3 Am.
J ur., pp. 25-31.)
9
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''The rule is based upon considerations of
practical necessity in the orderly adn1inistration
of law and of fairness to the court and the opposite
party, and upon the principles underlying the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Obviously, the
ends of justice are served by the avoidance of the
delay and expense incident to appeals, reversals
and new trials upon grounds of objection which
might have been obviated or corrected in the trial
court if the question had been raised." (3 Am.
J ur. Sec. 246, p. 25-28)
The Supreme Court of Utah has followed the rule in
many cases. In Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Company, 74 Utah 24,276 P. 659, this court stated:
"The contention is made on behalf of defendant Wright, however, that the complaint does not
allege that plain tiff is a holder in due course of
the note sued upon, and therefore no issue is
raised as to whether or not plaintiff is or is not
a bona fide holder for value of such note. The
complaint does allege 'that the plaintiff is now
the owner and holder of said note,' meaning the
note indorsed by vVright and upon which this
action is founded. No question was raised in the
trial court that the complaint is uncertain or
ambiguous in not alleging the kind of holder plaintiff claimed to be. Such question is raised for the
first time in the brief filed on behalf of Wright.
In the absence of a timely attack up,on the complaint in such respect, "\Vright should not be heard
to complain about any ambiguity or uncertainty
of the complaint for the first time in this court."
(P. 677)
In Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, this court
said:
10
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"Many errors are assigned; ... others raise
questions not presented in the court below; . . .
"Such ornissions and com1nissions on the part
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of
practice of this court and have been conde1nned
1>y the decisions of the court in every case with
which we are familiar wherein the objection has
been reasonably n1ade and relied upon."
In Summit County v. Gustaveson, 18 Utah 351, 54 P. 977,
this court said :
''Counsel in the case have discussed the question of the constitutionality of the statute and the
ordinance created under it, but inasn1uch as that
<-luestion was not presented to or passed upon by
the trial court, we refrain from any discussion of
that question at this tirne. The questions we have
discussed are the only questions passed upon by
the trial court."
In North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co.,
223 P. 2d 577, this court, in holding that it was unable
to pass on the contention that a motion to dismiss should
not have been granted for the reason that appellant Gibbs
was entitled to darnages for the use of the pipe line
extension during a period of temporary occupancy,
stated:
"'-rhe reason that we are precluded from considering the 4uestion is that the issues were not
framed in the court below. We cannot pass on
rnatters raised for the first tinte in this court."
Respondent believes that the case of Fee v. First
National Bank of the Republic, 37 Utah 28, 106 P. 517,
decided by this court, is closely in point. There, as in
the case at bar, counsel limited the question to be decided
11
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by the trial court. In that case the question was limited
to determining whether appellant had in fact paid the
surn in controversy to the respondent or his order. The
court, in its opinion, stated:
"It seems that at the trial the question of
whether such payment was made was thought to
depend entirely on whether the check for $1,075
was genuine or not. This at least was the theory
of counsel who represented appellant at the trial,
as clearly appears from his own statement, which
is incorporated into and made a part of the bill
of exceptions. Counsel there said that, if the
court found for the appellant 'on the question of
the genuiness of the signature of Dennis Fee, ...
judgment should be entered in favor of plaintjff
in the sum of $2.62, with interest and costs of
suit.' Counsel for appellant thus, in effect, told
the court that, if the court found that the check
for $1,075 was genuine, then appellant was
entitled to a credit for the gross amount deposited
which it had admitted it had received from
respondent, and under such finding respondent
would be still entitled to a judgment for $2.62, the
balance rernaining on deposit with appellant.
Counsel thus asked the court to make appellant's
liability depend upon the genuineness of the signature to the check, and upon nothing else. The
court thus elem.inated all other questions ..."
(Emphasis ours).
Appellant in its brief, in the Fee case, argued that
there was evidence tending to show that respondent
authorized the drawing and issuance of the check to
which respondent's name was signed without his authority. Appellant also pointed out that ~here was some evidence tending to show that respondent was guilty of a

12
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lack of diligence in failing to notify appellant not to
honor or pay the check. The court said:
''Appellant now urges that we pass upon
those questions and insists that the findings and
judg1nent ought to have been in favor of appellanr,, 111 view of the state of the evidence upon
those questions. These matters were, however, not
sulnn,itted to the trial court. As we have seen, the
pleadings presented but one issue and that was
whether appellant had on respondent's dernand
paid hun the SUlll of $1,075. . . If we should
assmne, therefore, that under the issues presented
by the pleadings the court should have passed
upon two propositions ( 1) whether the check was
genuine- that is, whether it was signed by
respondent-and (2) if not signed by hi1n, whether
he nevertheless permitted the same to be issued,
presented for payment, and paid, when he could
have prevented such a result, yet in view of the
only qtttestion which counsel for appellant asked
the tr,ial court to pass on, and which it did, we are
not authorized to pass upon the second proposition stated above, for the reason that the trial
co1.,~rt did not pass ttpon it and was not asked to do
so, but the court was asked to and did Inake the
liability of appellant depend upon the genuineness
of the signature to the check. . . If counsel had no
confidence in the evidence adduced in support of
the second proposition, why should the court have
considered it? r:ehe findings respond to the issues
as presented by the pleadings, and, in view of
counsel's state1nent to the court, they also covered
all questions raised by the evidence. This is all
appellant can insist upon, and this is especially so
in view of the fact that appellant did not request
any findings upon the collateral questions which
it now urges should be passed upon. (As in the

13
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case at bar.) The most that can be said with
regard to the appellant's contentions relative to
the findings is that appellant has changed counsel
(as in the case at bar) and that it has also changed
the theory upon which the case was presented to
the trial court." (Emphasis added)
It is, therefore, Respondent's contention that Appellant cannot raise in this court any question relating to the
validity of the By-Laws adopted by the Respondent
corporation, because no such question was ever submitted
for consideration of the court below, and consideration of
the court below was limited to the validity of the three
By-Laws.
POINT II.
APPELLANT CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF
DEFENSE UPON WHICH THE ISSUE PRESENTED TO THE
TRIAL COURT WAS TRIED AND PRESENT A NEW
THEORY OF DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE
APPELLATE COURT.

The Appellant, in Points I and II of his Statement
of Points, has changed the theory and defense· upon
which the issue was presented to the trial court. In the
court below it was Appellant's contention that the aforementioned three paragraphs in the By-Laws, the validity
of which was submitted to the court below as the only
issue, were invalid because they deprived him of the
beneficial use of the Respondent's range for grazing his
individually owned livestock thereon and preyented him
from using it in accordance with his own wishes. Appellant, in his brief, for the first time now contends that all
of the By-Laws, including the two specifically passed

14
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upon by the trial court and set out in his Point II, are
invalid and illegal for the reason that they change the
purpose and character of the company from that of a
general business corporation to a non-profit cooperative
association. No such theory was ever suggested to the
trial court. IIad Appellant raised that theory or defense
in the court below, evidence and testimony could have
been taken from which the trial court could have decided
that contention. Appellant, in his brief, assumes that the
Respondent corporation started as a general business
corporation and changed to a cooperative upon the adoption of its By-Laws on March 4, 195'2. Not only is such
assumption erroneous, but Appellant himself knows that
the use to which the range has been put has never
changed over the years ( R. 58).
In the stipulation it was specifically stated that it
was Appellant's contention that the aforementioned three
paragraphs of the By-Laws were "unfair, inequitable,
unlawful, contrary to the interests and objects of the
Articles of Incorporation, discriminative and prejudicial
to the defendant's (Appellant's) substantive rights and
interests as a stockholder." (R. 29). The stipulation did
not state in what particulars the said three paragraphs
met these contentions and the question may well be asked,
"What was Appellant's theory or defense in the court
below~"

"In order to determine the theory of a case
as presented to the trial court, the appellate court
will look to the entire record and the briefs of
counsel and will construe the pleadings on the
theory most apparent, most clearly outlined by

15
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the facts stated and according to their general
scope and tenor." (3 Am. Jur. :Sec. 253 p. 38)
An examination of the record will di~close that
Appellant in the court below never suggested at that tin1e
or in any of his pleadings that the By-Laws or any of
them were invalid because they changed the nature of
the business from that of a business corporation for
profit to a non-profit cooperative association. His contention that certain of the By-Laws were contrary to the
interests and objects of the corporation was never based
in the court below upon the theory he now attempts to
assert on appeal. On the contrary, in the court below
Appellant went to the opposite extreme and based his
attack upon certain of the By-Laws upon the ground that
as a stockholder in Respondent corporation he had the
unqualified right to place his cattle upon the company
range without restrictio.n &."(Cept as to the number of
cattle to be so placed, that the By-Laws as adopted interfered with that right, and that he had that right as a
stockholder by virtue of the fact that the company was
originally organized for the purpose of providing range
land for the stockholders' cattle. Appellant knows that
the company never operated fo.r profit and that the ByLaws made no change in the operations of the Respondent with respect to the purpose for which the range was
owned and held by the Respondent.
An exan1ination of the record will support Respondent's foregoing staten1ent of Appellant's theory in the
trial court. In his answer to the complaint, Appellant, in
discussing paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of the By-
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Laws, makes the same contentions with respect thereto
as those set out in the stipulation and heretofore in this
brief, and asserts that said By-Laws were "confiscatory
of this Defendant's right to the beneficial use of the
range pursuant to his share of stock in the plaintiff
corporation for the Board of Directors to require him to
keep his cattle in the areas designated by the Board of
Directors," ( en1phasis ours) and further, that because he
is the only stockholder "running cattle on the range," the
others being sheep men, the said two By-Laws deprive
him "of his equitable beneficial use of the range." (R.
7, 8).
Further light is thrown upon the question of what
Appellant's theory was in the trial court in his Third
Defense to the complaint set out in his answer, wherein
Appellant asserts that the purported By-Laws referred
to in the complaint "are unlawful, inequitable and prejudicial to the substantive rights of the defendant as a
minority stockholder in the plaintiff corporation and are
contrary to the intents and objects of the Articles of
Incorporation of the plaintiff corporation in the particular that said By-Laws fail to equitably and annually
assess the expenses of reasonable and beneficial use of
the range as between the sheep men and this defendant,
who is a cattle man." (Emphasis ours) (R. 9) In this
Third Defense, Appellant also alleges that he has offered
"to accept a division of the range land proportionate to
his share in said plaintiff corporation," and that the
Board of Directors has refused to cooperate with him in ·
"working out a fair and impartial solution to the prob-
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lems incidential to running sheep and cattle on the same
range." (R. 9)
The theory of Appellant's defense is also revealed
in his Counterclaim, wherein, after setting out c-ertain
by-laws, including the three which were subn1itted to the
court for a ruling thereon, Appellant alleges that originally the Respondent company was organized for the purpose of "providing range land for cattle," but that since
then substantially all of the stockholders except Appellant have become sheep men. It is further alleged that in
passing and enforcing said by-laws the company had
made "it utterly impracticable, unfeasible, and economically impossible for defendant to keep his livestock in
the area or areas designated," and that the Respondent
has failed and refused to "take cognizance of this defendant's rights to fair and equitable use of the range as a
shareholder." (R. 11)
Appellant's prayer for relief in the Counterclaim
prays that the court restrain the Appellant from administering the affairs of the company which in any manner
deprives the Appellant "of any equal and equitable benef'icial use of the range." He further asked the court to
either (1) divide and partition the company's range land
and to set aside his proportionate share as his "own land
in fee simple," (2) appoint an impartial referee to make
an inspection and recon1mendation to the court for the
designation of a permanent area or alternating areas of
the range to be used as cattle range so that said area or
areas might be fenced at the Respondent's expense, or
(3) that necessary herders be hired at corporation expense ( R. 12, 13).
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Appellant's counsel in the court below submitted a
memorandum brief and a reply which clearly demonstrate his theory and defense. On page 3 of his memorandtun brief appears the following:
"Surely our opponents will concede that the
prin1ary purpose and object of the plaintiff
organization was to enable its members to receive
equal beneficial use of the range in proportion to
the respective shares held by each member. This
has been the primary objectives of this company
for over forty years ... " (einphasis ours) ( R. 58)
And on page 4 of his memorandum:
"'J.1he real sting in the by-laws, and which has
precipitated this law suit, is found in Article V,
paragraph 11, which deprives the defendant, not
only of a fair and equal beneficial use of the
range, but would force him out of the corporation,
and incidentally, deprive hi1n of his present means
of livelihood. Such effect was never the intent and
purpose of the corporation when organized exclusively as a cattle range, or when the articles were
amended to permit both cattle and sheep on the
range .. .
" . . . said by-laws are in the particular
·referred to unfair, unequitable, unlawful, contrary
to the intents and objectives of the Articles of
Incorporation, discrin1inative and prejudicial to
the sustantive and contractual rights and interests of the defendant ... " (emphasis ours) ( R.
59)

Appellant's reply memorandum brief filed in the
court below contains similar allegations (R. 70-72).
Thus, it can be seen that Appellant in the court below
never took the position, as he now does, that the three
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by-laws in question, or all of then1 for that matter, were
. unlawful, discriminative, prejudicial to his rights or contrary to the interests and objects of the Articles of
Incorporation because they change the c01npany from a
general business corporation to that of a cooperative.
His theory and defense was entirely based upon the claim
that the by-laws prevented him from using the company
range as he saw fit and as he had always done in the past
in placing his own cattle upon it.
It is well settled that the theory upon which the
case was tried in the court below rnust be strictly adhered
to on appeal. This rule has been followed by this court
1n many cases.
In Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457,
this court said:
"The pleadings and the trial proceeded upon
the theory that the spring water involved in this
controversy was originally public water, and M
such, subject to appropriation. The cause having
been tried on such theory, \Ye are not at liberty to
dispose of it upon s01ne other theory."

Smith v. Sinaloa LGJnd & Fruit Co., 42 Utah 445, 132
P. 556, was a case in which plaintiff contended in his
complaint that the assessment against his stock was void
for certain stated reasons. For the first time on appeal
he alleged as a reason that the assessment was void that
the statute prevented assessments against fully paid
stock unless axpressly authorized in the articles of incorporation and that since the articles were not in evidence,
there was nothing to show it was permissible. This court
pointed out that "neither by the pleadings nor evidence
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was it claimed or shown that the assessment was not
authorized by the articles of incorporation." This court
then said:
"No such point was rnade in the court below.
It is pressed on u~ here for the first tirne without
issue or evidence . . . In this the plaintiff does
violence to the farniliar rules that judicial in-.
quiries must be confined to the issues, and that
one rna.y not present and try a cause on one theory
in the court below and be heard on another in the
court above."
In Chipman v. American Fork City, 54 Utah 93, 179
P. 742, the court held that the defense that the damage
complained of was the result of an act of God was not
available on appeal because not raised in the court below.
This rule was again stated by this court in Aaron v.
Holmes, 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450, as follows:
" . . . It is also a well-settled rule that a
theory, assumed and acted upon by the parties
litigant in the trial court, must be adhered to upon
appeal. Lebcher v. Lambert, 23 Utah 1, 63, Pac.
628; Elliott on App. Pro. § 490. In 2 Cyc. 670, it
is said: 'One of the rnost important results of the
rule that questions which are not raised in the
court below c-annot be reviewed in the appellate
court is that a party cannot, when a cause is
brought up for appellate review, assume an attitude inconsistent with that taken by him at the
trial, but that such party is restricted to the
theory on which the cause was prosecuted or defended in the court below. Thus, where both
parties act upon a particular theory of the cause
of action, they will not be permitted to depart
therefrom when the case is brought up for appellate review.' Numerous cases are cited in the
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footnote, which illustrate and support the doctrine. As we have pointed out, respondent conceded in the lower court that appellant's default
occurred through 'inadvertence and excusable
neglect,' and the questions involved were submitted to the court upon that theory. Therefore
under all the authorities he is precluded from
taking any other or different position in this
court."
In Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Ba.nkers, 80 Utah
587, 16 P. 2d 212, this court held that where, in the trial
court, the objection was made that the testimony offered
by a witness was irrelevant and immaterial and selfserving, and, for the first time on appeal, appellant contended that the witness offering such testimony was not
a competent witness in the proceeding because of a statutory prohibition, it would not consider that objection
because that theory had not been presented in the court
below.
In Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P. 2d 928, in
which case the only contention appellant Eisen made in
the trial court was that his daughter was not acting as
his agent when she entered into a contract of purchase
of a home, this court said:
"However, upon this appeal that contention
has been abandoned by Mr. Eisen. He now contends for the first tirne that (1) (three other
separate contentions set out)."
"It is not necessary for us to examine on their
merits the three contentions raised by 1\fr. Eisen
on this appeal. They are all matters of defense
which should have been raised below and cannot
now be· heard here for the first time."
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Appellant's entire argument in his brief is based
upon his assertion that the Articles of Incorporation
created a general business corporation for profit and
that the by-laws changed that purpose to a non-profit
cooperative. I-Iad he raised it in the trial court, Respondent would have had an opportunity to show otherwise and
the trial court would have had the benefit of evidence
and testlinony in passing upon such argument. The
principles of law laid down by the courts in the rases
cited by ..:\.ppellant may well be correct, but it is neither
fair to the trial court nor to Respondent to raise the
defense or theory asserted in his Points I and II here
for the first tin1e on appeal.
Respondent wishes to point out, however, that there
is no basis for the defense now raised by Appellant in
this appeal. As stated before, the Respondent company
was incorporated in 1900 under the Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1888. Section 2267 permitted the formation of all
types of corporations, as for example, "benevolent, charitable or scientific associations, or for any rightful subject . .. " The Articles of Incorporation gave to Respondent the power "to buy, hold, own, occupy and sell real
estate." (R. 4.0) It has bought and sold real estate, and
it now holds, owns and occupies real estate, and has ever
since its incorporation. Respondent was also given the
power to assess the stock "to meet all incidental expenses
of the company." (R. 43) If it were organized as a profitmaking company, it would hardly need provide for
assessments to meet the "incidental expenses .of the company." It is true that the emnpany does not exercise all
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its powers, and never has, but, as is generally the case,
the powers given under the articles were broad and
generally stated, and it is fundamental that a corporation need not &.'Xiercise all of its powers granted under
the articles. At the risk of being repetitious, let us say
that no clearer statement of the purposes for which the
company was organized can be given than that made by
Appellant's counsel in the court below when he said that
"the primary purpose and object of the plaintiff organization was to enable its members to receive equal beneficial use of the range in proportion to the respective
shares held by each member. This has been the primary
objective of this compawy for over forty years . .. " (R.
58) The company has never operated as a general business corporation for profit and was not organized as
such. Since Appellant has changed his theory as herein
pointed out, Respondent deems it unnecessary to pursue
this n1atter further, but did desire to point out to the
court that there Is, even so, no 1nerit to Appellant's
contentions.
POINT III.
PARAGRAPH 5,_ ARTICLE I OF THE BY-LAWS IS
ILLEGAL BY AUTHORIZING THE COMPANY TO PURCHASE ITS OWN STOCK IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW.

Appellant contends that this provision of the by-laws
is illegal because Section 76-13-4(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 (formerly Section 103-12-4), as that section is
interpreted by this court in Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91
Utah 132, 59· P. 2d 1, prohibits a corporation from purchasing its own stock.
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In Pace v. Pace Bros., the facts involved a suit by a
distributee on promissory notes given by the corporation to the distributee's father in exchange for the latter's stock in the corporation. A mortgage on the corporate property was given to secure the notes and the suit
was one of foreclosure. The Supren1e Court took the
position that Section 103-12-4, R. S. 1933, prohibited a
corporation from purchasing its own stock under the
circmnstances that existed in the Pace case. In so doing,
the court said :
"We consider the question as to whether the
defendant corporation, under the circumstances in
which this purchase was made, had authority to
buy its own stock held by Sidney Pace. Our decisi.on on that question will be li1nited strictly on the
facts of this case." (En1phasis added)
The court also made the observation that, "In the
instant case the purchase of Sidney Pace's stock does
appear not to have been done for the protection of the
co1npany, but for the benefit and accomodation of Pace,"
and in its decision stated:
"\Ve believe that 103-12-4, subd. 2., was designed to prevent the purchase by a corporation
of its own stock even though at the time of the
purchase it was not insolvent nor would be by
suc-h purchase rendered insolvent, at least in cases
where it was not for the protection of the corporation or for its legitimate corporate purposes."
(Emphasis ours.)
The court also points out in the Pace case that there
was no evidence that the property covered by the mortgage was not part of the "capital" of the company rather
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than being included as "surplus" on the books of the company.
Thus it seems to Respondent that the Pace decision
n1ust be limited to the facts of that particular case and
cannot be taken to mean that any repurchase of its stock
by a co-rporation, regardless of the circumstances, is void
under the law.
In the instant case the attack is n1erely upon the
legality of a by-law that provides that in the future a
stockholder desiring to sell his stock must first offer to
sell the san1e "to the Company or other stockholders at
the price offered." If such a time came, the circumstances
may be such that even under the doctrine of the Pace
case, the purchase by the company, if undertaken, might
be justified by ( 1) the need of the company to protect
itself, as, for example, from selling the stock to one who
had an inferior or diseased group of cattle or sheep to
place on the range, or ( 2) by the fact that the purchase
could be made by some means other than through use
of the "capital" of the company.
But aside from all this, Respondent believes there is
a n1ore important reason to support the legality of this
by-law.
At the time the Pace case was decided, subsection (~)
of 103-12-4, R. S. 1933, read as follows:
"'To divide, withdraw or in any manner,
except as provided by law, pay to the stockholders,
or any of the1n, any part of the capital of the
corporation;"
Ilowever, in 1943, this section was amended to
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exempt from its prov1s1ons the redemption and retirement of preferred stock on the condition and in the manner provided by the articles or the preferred stock certificate. And in 1951, a new section, approved March 1,
1951, prior to the adoption of the by-laws by Respondent,
was added to the law of corporation (Laws of 1951, Chap.
23, Sec. 2). This section, now 16-2-16, Utah Code Anno~
tated 1953, reads in part as follows:
'' . A. corporation may purchase or redeem one
or 1nore shares of any and all classes of its own
capital stock in any of the following cases:

·• (f) In any case where the use of the funds
or property of a corporation for such purchase or
rede1nption would not cause the irupairment of
that portion of its assets acquired as consideration for its shares or that portion which has been
treated as payment for shares allotted as stock
dividends."
Appellant ignores subsection (f) and states only that
"no provision is made in Section 16-2-16 for a general
purchase by the corporation of its own stock which would
change in any way the restriction of Section 76-13-4
(formerly 103-12-4) or the strict interpretation placed
upon that latter section by the Pace case." The Pace case
itself interpreted the clause "except as provided by law,"
as usd in 103-12-4(2) and now included in 76-13-4(2), to
mean statutory law and not general law as it e...-xists in
the states and enunciated by the courts.
Section 16-2-16(£) does away with the restriction of
76-13-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (formerly 103-12-4)
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except in those cases where the purchase of its own
stock would "cause the impairment of that portion of its
assets acquired as consideration for its shares," and
there is no basis whatsoever for Appellant's position
that this by-law is illegal, in the absence of any showing
that the by-law itself would require the purchase of its
own stock in a nmnner that would impair that portion of
its assets acquired as consideration for its shares.
Appellant makes no mention of that portion of paragraph 5, Article I which restricts the sale of his stock by
a stockholder without first offering it to other stockholders. Even if it could he held that that part of the
by-law directing that stock be offered first to the company is illegal (which we don't concede in any sense of
the word), it remains that that part of the by-law requiring an offer "to other stockholders" is valid.
"Where a bylaw is entire, each part having a
general influence over the rest, if one part is void,
the whole is void; but where a by-law consists of
several distinct and independent parts, though one
or more of them is void, the rest are valid. This
rule is applicable to the different clauses of the
same by-law; for where it consists of several particulars, it is, to all intents and purposes, several
by-laws, though the provisions are thrown together under the forn1 of one." (13 Am. Jur. 287,
Sec. 156)
The right to impose restrictions upon the transfer
of stock by means of by-laws is recognized under the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act and Section 16-3-15 of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, where the restriction is stamped
upon the stock certificate.
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According to the weight of authority, a corporate
by-law prohibiting the sale or transfer of its stock to an
outsider without first giving the other stockholders an
opportunity to purchase the same is valid and binding on
the stockholders. ( G5 A. L. R. 1168)
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The by-law in question expressly provides it shall
not be binding on any stockholder unless he surrenders
his certificate for the purpose of having the restriction
stamped on it (R. 31). Consequently, Appellant is not
bound by it unless he voluntarily consents to having such
restriction stamped on his certificate. Once he does so,
he is bound by his consent, because the by-laws are part
of the contract that exists between the stockholders.
Appellant has not done so. While Respondent questions
Appellant's right to attack the validity of a by-law by
which he is not hound, in view of what has already been
said Appellant believes there is no need to pursue the
matter further.
In summary, it is incredible that Appellant ·should
claim in the trial court that he will be denied, by these
three by-laws, the beneficial use of the range as a stockholder, which use, he rightfully states, its stockholders
have had for "over forty years," and for which purpose,
he states, the company was organized, and then come
before this court, reverse hirnself, and for the first time
suggest that all of the by-laws are invalid, and in effect,
state that for fifty-three years the company has operated
illegally by permitting its stockholders to use the company range.
As was stated in the Fee case (supra), "the most
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that can be said with regard to Appellant's contentions
... is that Appellant has changed counsel."

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court in adjudging
paragraph 5 of Article I and paragraphs 8 and 11 of
Article V to be valid and binding on the stockholders
should be affirmed for the reasons stated.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN S. BOYDEN,
BRYANT H. CROFT,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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